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**JUDG**  
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**DISTRICT COURT**  
**CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

\* \* \*

INNOVATIVE ENERGY SOLUTIONS,  
INC.,

*Plaintiff,*

v.

TERRY DINGWALL, an individual,  
STEPHEN MONACO, an individual, DAVID  
E. GRISWOLD, an individual, ROE  
BUSINESS ENTITIES I through X; and  
DOES XI through XX, inclusive,

*Defendants.*

Case No.: A508740  
Dept No.: XI

**JUDGMENT AGAINST FOSTER,  
COCHRANE AND DORNAN**

Hearing Date: N/A  
Hearing Time: N/A

TERRY DINGWALL, individually and  
derivatively on behalf of INNOVATIVE  
ENERGY SOLUTIONS, INC.

*Counterclaimants,*

v.

RONALD FOSTER, an individual; PATRICK  
COCHRANE, an individual; FREDERICK  
DORNAN, an individual; INNOVATIVE  
ENERGY SOLUTIONS, INC., nominally; and  
DOES I through XX, inclusive,

*Counterdefendants.*

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<p>RONALD FOSTER, an individual, <i>Counterclaimant,</i></p> <p>v.</p> <p>TERRY DINGWALL, an individual, STEPHEN MONACO, an individual, <i>Counterdefendant.</i></p> <hr/> <p>HYUNIK YANG, HYUNSUK CHAI, <i>Plaintiffs in Intervention,</i></p> <p>v.</p> <p>INNOVATIVE ENERGY SOLUTIONS, INC., a Nevada Corporation; PATRICK COCHRANE; RONALD FOSTER; FRED DORNAN, DOES 1through 10; and ROE Corporations A through Z, <i>Defendants in Intervention.</i></p>
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This action was initiated when Innovative Energy Solutions, Inc. (“IESI”) filed its complaint against Terry Dingwall (“Dingwall”), Stephen Monaco, David Griswold and Bradshaw Smith & Co., LLP.<sup>1</sup> When IESI initiated this action, Ronald Foster (“Foster”), Patrick Cochrane (“Cochrane”) and Fredrick Dornan (“Dornan”) were in control of IESI and selected this Nevada forum as the proper jurisdiction to resolve IESI’s claims. Thereafter, Dingwall and the other defendants filed their answers and affirmative defenses and, further, Dingwall filed counterclaims against Foster, Cochrane and Dornan. When Dingwall’s claims were asserted against Foster, Cochrane and Dornan, Foster resided in Nevada; Cochrane and Dornan resided in Alberta, Canada—all were properly served and all retained counsel in Nevada to represent their interests, including the filing of answers and affirmative defenses to the counterclaims and they asserted counterclaims against Dingwall. Eventually, Dr. Hyunik Yang (“Yang”) and Hyunsuk Chai (“Chai”) intervened in this action and asserted claims against Foster, Cochrane and Dornan, who

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<sup>1</sup> Stephen Monaco and Bradshaw Smith & Co., LLP, were subsequently dismissed from this action.

1 were all properly served. Foster, Cochrane and Dorman, through their retained counsel, filed their  
2 answers and affirmative defenses to Yang and Chai's claims. Foster, Cochrane and Dorman  
3 voluntarily attorned to the jurisdiction of this Court and, through Nevada counsel retained by them,  
4 actively participated in this case for approximately one year.

5 On June 22, 2007, following the Court's acceptance of live oral testimony (i.e., *viva voce*) in  
6 Las Vegas from Foster, Cochrane and Dorman, the Court struck all pleadings filed by Foster,  
7 Cochrane and Dorman and entered default against them as a sanction for their wrongful conduct,  
8 including intentional disobedience of this Court's Order filed on March 1, 2007, as set forth in more  
9 detail in this Court's Order filed on July 6, 2007. The court conducted a prove-up hearing on July  
10 17, 2007, where the Court again accepted *viva voce* testimony from Dingwall and Yang to ascertain  
11 the damages incurred by Dingwall, individually and derivatively on behalf of IESI, and by Yang and  
12 Chai, individually and derivatively on behalf of IESI. Dingwall and Yang were both cross-  
13 examined by counsel for Foster, Cochrane and Dorman. Based upon the papers and pleadings on  
14 file herein, the striking of Foster, Cochrane and Dorman's pleadings, the live witness testimony and  
15 documentary evidence presented at the prove-up hearing and for good cause appearing, the Court  
16 finds, concludes, orders, adjudges and decrees as follows:

17 **FINDINGS OF FACT**

18 The Court finds as follows:

- 19 1. Foster, Cochrane and Dorman have engaged in a pattern of deceitful conduct and  
20 self-dealing designed to enrich themselves personally to the detriment of IESI and its shareholders  
21 and note holders.
- 22 2. Foster, Cochrane and Dorman knowingly and intentionally filed a false SB-2 with the  
23 Securities and Exchange Commission in order to induce third parties to invest money with IESI.
- 24 3. Foster, Cochrane and Dorman sold securities to unaccredited investors in numerous  
25 states in the United States and several provinces in Canada. The securities, consisting of  
26 convertible promissory notes, were not registered nor were exemptions from registration perfected  
27 under state securities laws.

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1           13.     Moreover, despite representing that IESI acquired the oil remediation equipment  
2 outright, Foster, Cochrane and Dornan have caused IESI to pay approximately \$17,000 per month  
3 for the same equipment.

4           14.     Foster, Cochrane and Dornan have caused many of IESI's contracts and agreements  
5 to be drafted by Young Sook Jo ("Young"), Cochrane's spouse, and have retained Ms. Young to  
6 provide other legal services to IESI.

7           15.     Young is not a licensed attorney in any American or Canadian jurisdiction.

8           16.     Moreover, Foster, Cochrane and/or Dornan have caused IESI to issue at least three  
9 checks to a company called Eye Span Entertainment with the description "Payment for legal fees."  
10 Foster owns Eye Span Entertainment and neither Foster nor Eye Span Entertainment is an attorney.

11          17.     Foster, Cochrane and Dornan caused IESI to acquire Innovative Energy Solutions,  
12 Inc, an Alberta, Canada Corporation ("IESI Canada") in an asset sale in order to circumvent the  
13 need for an audit, which would have disclosed Foster, Cochrane and Dornan' inability and/or  
14 refusal to account for "hundreds of thousands of dollars" that are unaccounted for.

15          18.     Indeed, in a June 7, 2004, confidential, but unprivileged, communication to other  
16 board members, Dornan stated regarding IESI Canada's accounting, "Hundreds of thousands of  
17 dollars have been in and out of I.E.S.I. with no 'back up' documentation. Large amounts of money  
18 have been used it would seem for personal expenses without any supporting documentation."  
19 Dornan continued, "The books are a mess . . ."

20          19.     Foster, Cochrane and Dornan caused IESI to advance at least \$300,000 dollars to  
21 IESI Canada despite knowing that IESI Canada had no means of repaying any advances to IESI.

22          20.     Rather than account for the advances to IESI Canada as expenses, Foster, Cochrane  
23 and Dornan listed the advances as receivables, thereby causing IESI's assets to be overstated and its  
24 expenses understated.

25          21.     IESI Canada's shareholders received 6,000,000 shares of IESI in exchange for all of  
26 IESI Canada's assets. Rather than having all shareholders of IESI Canada receive proportionate  
27 numbers of shares of IESI, however, Foster, Cochrane and Dornan caused themselves to receive  
28 more shares while other outsiders received fewer shares than they were entitled to.

1           22.     Foster, Cochrane and Dornan caused IESI to pay its employees as independent  
2 contractors in an attempt to avoid paying employment taxes.

3           23.     On at least one occasion, Foster requested that Dingwall destroy IESI board minutes  
4 and Foster has further commingled IESI books and records with those of other companies in which  
5 he owns an interest.

6           24.     Foster also made various misrepresentations to Certified Public Accountant, Doug  
7 Winters, who was conducting due diligence of IESI books and records in early 2005. Such  
8 misrepresentations include, but are not limited to, giving Mr. Winters a Corporate and Capital  
9 Structure report dated May 2, 2005, that showed Dr. Yang sold 300,000 shares for \$550,000. When  
10 Mr. Winters asked Foster about the report, Foster said the report was out of date and contained  
11 mistakes. Foster then gave Mr. Winters a new Corporate and Capital Structure report dated May  
12 13, 2005, which showed Dr. Yang sold the 300,000 shares for \$750,000.

13           25.     Additionally, while Dingwall was the president of IESI, Foster misrepresented that  
14 Foster was the president. Indeed, while the vice president of business development of IESI, Foster  
15 signed the newly issued certificates as the "President," even though he did not hold that  
16 position/title and there was no board authority for him to sign the certificates or the actual  
17 conversion of the underlying Promissory notes to stock.

18           26.     Moreover, Foster falsely misrepresented to potential investors that IESI would "be  
19 trading on the pink sheets by the end of July 2005 at the latest."

20           27.     Foster, Cochrane and Dornan caused IESI to grant several million option shares with  
21 a \$1.00 option fee, contrary to IESI's Bylaws and stock option plan.

22           28.     Foster, Cochrane and Dornan have further made numerous unauthorized changes to  
23 the registration of IESI's stock through IESI's online transfer agent, Transfer Online. For example,  
24 on March 30, 2005, Foster, Cochrane and Dornan caused IESI to issue 750,000 shares to Bugg, and  
25 then on June 6, 2005, Counterdefendant Foster cancelled said shares. Additionally, on August 22,  
26 2005, Foster, Cochrane and Dornan caused a stop to be issued on Dingwall's 500,000 shares.

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1 29. According to IESI's Form SB-2 registration statement as prepared by Foster:

2 On March 24, 2004 the Company issued 2,160,000 preferred shares to Foster and issued  
3 a \$1,100,000 note for 5,000 shares of SBI Communications, Inc., an entity wholly  
4 owned by Foster, and whose only asset was 18.7 acres of land and an 80,000 square foot  
5 commercial building in Piedmont, Alabama. The transaction was valued at the seller's  
6 depreciated cost basis of \$4,724,455. The preferred stock issued was valued at  
\$3,624,455 because the Company's accounting policy for valuing non-monetary  
transactions with a related party required the transaction be valued at the predecessors'  
depreciable cost basis. The property was acquired with the intent to be used for  
assembly of the Company's planned products for sale.

7 30. IESI's documents, however, show a pattern of Foster, Cochrane and Dorman' creating  
8 and modifying documents to fit their ever-changing story. For example, Foster was issued 1,400,000  
9 shares on January 25, 2004 (Company's stock transfer records). It was not until November 9, 2004,  
10 that Foster was issued an additional 760,000 shares. Indeed, Foster created two sets of minutes for one  
11 board meeting allegedly held on May 9, 2004, as well as a set of minutes for another meeting allegedly  
12 held on May 5, 2004.

13 31. The three sets of minutes reflect as follows:

14	May 5, 2004	1,400,000 shares at \$5.00/share for \$7,000,000	To acquire Piedmont, AL real estate from SBI	Foster signed
15				
16				
17	May 9, 2004	1,400,000 shares at \$5.00/share for \$7,000,000	To acquire SBI stock from Foster	Foster signed
18				
19	May 9, 2004	2,160,000 shares at \$2.50/share for \$5,400,000	To acquire SBI stock from Foster	Unsigned
20				

21 32. The pertinent SB-2 states:

22 We acquired the land because of expressed interest from the city of  
23 Piedmont for a \$10 million Industrial Development Bond issue to finance  
a manufacture [sic] facility for our heat pipe and hydrogen units.

24 33. Foster fabricated the alleged interest by the City of Piedmont by drafting the letters  
25 of interest himself or causing his agent to draft the letters.

26 34. Foster, Cochrane and Dorman caused IESI to issue Foster 2,160,000 preferred shares  
27 in exchange for 5,000 shares of stock in an insolvent company known as SBI Communications, Inc.  
28 ("SBI").

1 35. SBI filed for bankruptcy and was, therefore, presumptively insolvent, less than one  
2 month before SBI was "purchased" by IESI. Nonetheless, Foster, Cochrane and Dornan, and in  
3 particular Foster, never disclosed in financial statements that SBI was in bankruptcy.

4 36. Foster paid for personal expenses with the consideration he received for the SBI  
5 transaction.

6 37. Furthermore, despite IESI making certain insurance payments associated with SBI,  
7 Foster took and pocketed similar payments from SBI that were disguised as insurance payments.

8 38. Moreover, Foster paid himself a purported "management fee" out of SBI's  
9 bankruptcy in excess of \$25,000.00, which fees should have been paid to IESI, not Foster.

10 39. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan have caused IESI to issue Cochrane over \$50,000 in  
11 funds allegedly for reimbursements and advances for which Cochrane has not accounted for.

12 40. Foster's employment agreement with IESI requires that he "will devote . . .  
13 substantially all of [his] business time to the performance of [his] duties for, and in the business and  
14 affairs of, Company." However, Foster has owned and managed Eye Span Entertainment Network,  
15 Inc., and has provided services for other corporations as well, in violation of his employment  
16 agreement with IESI.

17 41. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan have caused IESI to improperly advance funds and  
18 issue bonuses to Foster, which have not been accounted for, and which are believed to be for non-  
19 business, personal reasons.

20 42. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan also caused IESI to improperly pay funds to David  
21 Friedland for "Legal Fees - Juris Doctor - Setting up international operating structure," while  
22 knowing that Mr. Friedland is a convicted felon.

23 43. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan have further caused IESI to employ Ms. Shirley  
24 Berquist as a full-time employee while wrongfully maintaining that Ms. Berquist is "outside labor."

25 44. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan have caused IESI to pay Bugg an inappropriate amount  
26 of consideration.

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1           45.     Mr. Bugg, who became a member of IESI's board of directors, verbally informed  
2 Dingwall that Dingwall was to allow Cochrane to do whatever he [Cochrane] wanted as "this [IESI]  
3 was his [Cochrane's] company and that I [Dingwall] had no business, or place to try and make  
4 Cochrane do otherwise."

5           46.     Additionally, on or about April 27, 2005, Foster, Cochrane and Dornan caused IESI  
6 to issue a shareholder update stating, "IESI has now completed an exclusive licensing deal for the  
7 issue of its cold fusion technology with the Ethanol industry in North America. This brings  
8 immediate revenue." This representation was then and still is untrue.

9           47.     On or about April 28, 2005, Foster, Cochrane and Dornan were made aware of  
10 numerous securities violations but have failed to take necessary steps to correct such violations.

11           48.     In attempts to veil their illegal fundraising activities, Foster, Cochrane and Dornan  
12 have caused IESI to issue backdated employment contracts to various individuals, including Ron  
13 Johnson, Patrick Starr and Roy Ferguson.

14           49.     Foster, Cochrane and Dornan have caused IESI to issue an Executive Summary with  
15 the misrepresentation that "to date the company has raised in excess of \$10 million dollars from  
16 investors." Not only has IESI not raised such funds, Foster, Cochrane and Dornan illegally used  
17 this misrepresentation in an attempt to raise additional funds.

18           50.     Foster, Cochrane and Dornan also obtained shares in IESI fraudulently and/or  
19 without valid consideration.

20           51.     Foster, Cochrane and Dornan wrongfully terminated Dingwall, as president, and  
21 Stephen Monaco, as Vice President of Marketing and Public Relations.

22           52.     IESI, on the one hand, and Foster and Cochrane, on the other hand, entered into  
23 various contracts and agreements, including, but not limited to, employment agreements with Foster  
24 and Cochrane. IESI had justified expectations that Foster and Cochrane would perform in good  
25 faith under the terms of the contracts and agreements.

26           53.     IESI performed all conditions and obligations required of it under the contracts and  
27 agreements.

28

1           54. Foster and Cochrane materially breached the terms, both express and implied, of the  
2 contracts and agreements.

3           55. Additionally, Foster and Cochrane breached their duties by failing to perform and/or  
4 even attempt to perform under the terms of the agreements in a manner that is faithful to the  
5 purpose of the contracts.

6           56. Foster and Cochrane's breaches damaged Dingwall and the other IESI shareholders.

7           57. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan falsely represented their intent of bringing IESI's  
8 technology to fruition.

9           58. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan intended to utilize the services of Dingwall and then  
10 concoct a scheme upon which to terminate Dingwall's employment, officer and director status with  
11 IESI as well as to use IESI as a front for their own personal gain to the detriment of IESI and its  
12 investors.

13           59. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan intended to fraudulently induce IESI to enter into the  
14 various agreements with Foster, Cochrane and Dornan pertaining to IESI and its technology.

15           60. When Foster, Cochrane and Dornan made said representations, they knew them to be  
16 false, and intended to defraud, deceive and induce IESI and its shareholders into acting as it did.

17           61. IESI and its shareholders justifiably relied on Foster, Cochrane and Dornan's  
18 fraudulent misrepresentations.

19           62. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan wrongfully exercised dominion and control over IESI's  
20 funds and assets which they wrongfully withheld and/or received from IESI and thereby converted  
21 to their own use, benefit and gain, funds which rightly belonged to IESI and its shareholders.

22           63. The shares of stock purportedly issued to Foster, Cochrane and Dornan were  
23 received fraudulently and without consideration and should be cancelled and invalidated.

24           64. Yang and Chai are residents of South Korea and are stockholders of IESI.

25           65. Yang and Chai own six million (6,000,000) shares of preferred stock of IESI, which  
26 was issued to them on June 26, 2004.

27           66. The preferred stock of IESI can be converted to common stock on a one for one  
28 basis.

1           67.     At all relevant times, Foster was the Secretary, Treasurer and Director of IESI and  
2 resided in Las Vegas, Nevada and then Alberta, Canada.

3           68.     At all relevant times, Cochrane was a Director and Chief Executive Officer of IESI  
4 and resided in Alberta, Canada.

5           69.     Cochrane entered into an agreement with the Alberta Securities Commission  
6 wherein Cochrane admitted that he was involved in the unregistered trading securities of Genoray  
7 Advanced Technologies Ltd.

8           70.     Cochrane admitted that he made prohibited representations and misrepresentations to  
9 investors and he agreed (a) to pay Ten Thousand dollars (\$10,000.00) to settle the allegations, (b) to  
10 pay Three Thousand dollars (\$3,000.00) towards investigation costs, and (c) to cease trading in  
11 securities for a period of two (2) years.

12          71.     At all relevant times, Dornan was a Director of IESI and resided in Alberta, Canada.

13          72.     IESI is a Nevada corporation doing business in Clark County, Nevada and Alberta,  
14 Canada.

15          73.     Since IESI's incorporation, Foster, Cochrane and Dornan owned or controlled a  
16 majority of the capital stock of IESI.

17          74.     Dingwall is a current shareholder of and former Officer and Director of IESI.  
18 Dingwall made derivative shareholder claims against the Defendants for mismanagement of IESI.

19          75.     Foster, Cochrane and Dornan engaged in a pattern of deceitful conduct and self-  
20 dealing designed to enrich themselves personally to the detriment of IESI and its other shareholders  
21 and note holders.

22          76.     In May 2004 Dornan sold oil drilling equipment to IESI Canada. The equipment  
23 was certified by Dornan to be worth Four Hundred Eighty-six Thousand Five Hundred Twenty-one  
24 dollars and Forty cents (\$486,521.40) as of April 30, 2004. The very same equipment was held out  
25 by IESI to be worth Six Hundred Thirty-two Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-seven dollars and  
26 Eighty-two cents (\$632,477.82) as of May 7, 2004. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan held out the  
27 equipment as being worth in excess of Six Hundred Thousand dollars (\$600,000.00) in the SB-2.

28

1 77. The inflation of the value of Dornan's equipment on IESI's books was and is a  
2 material misrepresentation by Foster, Cochrane and Dornan to IESI's shareholders.

3 78. The equipments inflated values are summarized in the following table:  
4

5 <b>Equipment</b>	<b>April 30, 2004 Value</b>	<b>May 7, 2004 Value</b>	<b>One Week's Appreciation</b>
6 1. One Only Super 7 Sharples Centrifuge Serial # P3400	\$137,750.00	\$179,075.00	\$41,325.00
8 2. One Only 9 Centrifuge Stand	\$4,275.00	\$5,557.50	\$1,283.50
10 3. One Only 11 Westfella Osa 35 Centrifuge Skid Serial # 1648035	\$156,750.00	\$203,775.00	\$47,025.00
12 4. Two Only 13 Stainless Steel Heat Exchangers @ \$6,175.00	\$12,350.00	\$16,055.00	\$3,705.00
14 5. Only One Double 15 Screen Pot	\$3,325.00	\$4,322.50	\$997.50
16 6. One Only Trash 17 Pump	\$2,850.00	\$3,705.00	\$855.00
18 7. One Only Viking 19 Feed Pump	\$3,515.00	\$4,569.50	\$1,054.50
20 8. One Only Viking 21 Centrifugal Pump	\$1,900.00	\$2,470.00	\$570.00
22 9. One Only Wilden 23 Diaphragm Pump	\$1,778.00	\$2,311.40	\$533.40
24 10. One Only Viking 25 L120 Pump	\$1,778.40	\$2,311.92	\$1,133.52
26 11. One Only Stand- 27 alone 200 Amp Main Control Center	\$6,650.00	\$8,645.00	\$1,995.00
28 12. One Only Portable Lincoln Ranger Welder	\$3,750.00	\$4,875.00	\$1,125.00
13. One Only High- pressure Steam Plant Serial # S-33384	\$102,000.00	\$132,600.00	\$30,600.00

1	14. One Only Flat Deck Tandem Trailer, Serial # 2as9 Pf4828fb015323	\$4,300.00	\$5,590.00	\$1,290.00
2				
3	15. One Only Swaco High Speed ALI Shale Shaker, Serial # 72376	\$16,050.00	\$20,895.00	\$4,845.00
4				
5	16. One Only Site Office & Part Skid Trailer	\$17,500.00	\$22,750.00	\$5,250.00
6				
7	17. Miscellaneous Parts & Spares	\$10,000.00	\$13,000.00	\$3,000.00
8				
9	<b>Totals</b>	\$486,551.40	\$632,514.82	\$145,6587.42

10  
11 79. The SB-2 falsely claimed that IESI owned the improved real property located in  
12 Piedmont, Alabama and failed to disclose that IESI did not own certain oil cleanup assets that were  
13 contributed by Dornan, and listed the Dornan equipment at grossly inflated figures.

14 80. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan claimed in open court that they unwound the deal for  
15 the Piedmont Property in 2004.

16 81. Although Foster, Cochrane and Dornan unwound the deal for the Piedmont Property,  
17 Foster, Cochrane and Dornan never informed the shareholders of IESI that the deal had been  
18 unwound.

19 82. Although Foster, Cochrane and Dornan claimed to have unwound the purchase of  
20 the Piedmont Property, IESI paid the insurance for the property.

21 83. The shareholders of IESI relied on the statements made by Foster, Cochrane and  
22 Dornan in the SB-2 to purchase IESI stock.

23 84. In the SB-2, Foster, Cochrane and Dornan confirmed the fact that Yang and Chai  
24 own six million (6,000,000) shares of IESI preferred stock.

25 85. On May 15, 2005 Defendants knowingly and intentionally made materially incorrect  
26 statements in a Private Placement Memorandum ("First Memorandum") in order to induce third  
27 parties to invest money with IESI.

28

1           86.     The First Memorandum falsely claimed that IESI owned the Piedmont Property,  
2 failed to disclose that the deal for the Piedmont Property had been unwound by Foster, Cochrane  
3 and Dornan, failed to disclose that IESI did not own certain oil cleanup assets that were contributed  
4 by Dornan, and listed the Dornan equipment at grossly inflated figures.

5           87.     Foster, Cochrane and Dornan violated Federal and State Securities Law by providing  
6 copies of the First Memorandum to investors.

7           88.     The shareholders of IESI relied on the statements made by Foster, Cochrane and  
8 Dornan in the First Memorandum to purchase IESI stock.

9           89.     In the First Memorandum, Foster, Cochrane and Dornan confirmed the fact that  
10 Yang and Chai own six million (6,000,000) shares of IESI preferred stock.

11          90.     On June 10, 2005, Foster, Cochrane and Dornan knowingly and intentionally made  
12 materially incorrect statements in another Private Placement Memorandum (“Second  
13 Memorandum”) in order to induce third parties to invest money with IESI.

14          91.     The Second Memorandum falsely claimed that IESI owned the Piedmont Property,  
15 failed to disclose that the deal for the Piedmont Property had been unwound by Foster, Cochrane  
16 and Dornan, failed to disclose that IESI did not own certain oil cleanup assets that were contributed  
17 by Dornan, and listed the Dornan equipment at grossly inflated figures.

18          92.     Foster, Cochrane and Dornan violated federal and state securities law by providing  
19 copies of the Second Memorandum to investors.

20          93.     The shareholders of IESI relied on the statements made by Foster, Cochrane and  
21 Dornan in the Second Memorandum to purchase IESI stock.

22          94.     The Second Memorandum Defendants confirmed the fact that Yang and Chai own  
23 six million (6,000,000) shares of IESI preferred stock.

24          95.     In 2005, Foster, Cochrane and Dornan admitted that they “played some games” to  
25 get the equipment on the books and records of IESI.

26          96.     Dornan continues to hold himself out as the owner of the equipment and bills IESI  
27 Canada Seventeen Thousand dollars (\$17,000.00) a month for the equipment.

28

1           97.     Dornan double dipped IESI for the equipment. He received stock in IESI and  
2 payments of Seventeen Thousand dollars (\$17,000.00) per month on a lease.

3           98.     Foster, Cochrane and Dornan knowingly solicited and sold securities to unaccredited  
4 investors in numerous states in the United States and several provinces in Canada. The securities  
5 were not registered nor were they exemptions from registration perfected under state securities  
6 laws.

7           99.     Foster, Cochrane and Dornan failed to make any filings under applicable United  
8 States Securities Laws to perfect exemptions from registration under Regulation D. The failure to  
9 properly register the securities or perfect exemptions has resulted in IESI incurring substantial risk  
10 of loss from the investors, sanctions from governmental agencies, and possible criminal sanctions  
11 against the officers/directors of IESI.

12           100.    Foster received his stock in exchange for shares of SBI. The transaction between  
13 IESI and SBI was completely without value and a fraud against the shareholders of IESI.

14           101.    According to Foster, Cochrane and Dornan, the transaction was completely unwound  
15 in 2004.

16           102.    The shareholders should have been informed that SBI did not own the Piedmont  
17 Property when IESI traded its stock for Foster's share of SBI.

18           103.    The other Board Members and Officers of IESI knew, or should have known, all of  
19 this information and should have acted to protect the interests of the other shareholders.

20           104.    However, it appears these actions have gone unchallenged by those individuals.

21           105.    The fact that the IESI Board Members allowed the shareholders of IESI to believe  
22 that IESI owned the Piedmont Property is a complete dereliction of their duties to the IESI  
23 shareholders.

24           106.    Foster unilaterally converted the convertible promissory notes made by IESI to stock  
25 in IESI.

26           107.    On September 20, 2003 Foster, the Vice President of Business Development of IESI,  
27 signed the newly issued certificates as the President of IESI even though he did not hold this title  
28

1 and there was no board authority for him to sign the certificates or the actual conversion of the  
2 underlying Promissory Notes to stock.

3 108. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan wrote shareholders of IESI stating "IESI has now  
4 completed an exclusive licensing deal for the issue of its cold fusion technology with the Ethanol  
5 industry in North America. This brings immediate revenue." This statement was false, was known  
6 to be false when made, and was made to pacify investors who were concerned about their  
7 investments. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan violated State and Federal law by making false  
8 statements to the IESI shareholders.

9 109. As of April 28, 2005, Foster, Cochrane and Dornan were aware of numerous  
10 securities violations.

11 110. Notwithstanding their actual knowledge of the securities law violations, Foster,  
12 Cochrane and Dornan failed to take necessary steps to correct such violations.

13 111. Foster, Cochrane and Dornans' refusal to take corrective action is a dereliction of the  
14 duties they owe to the shareholders of IESI.

15 112. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan have placed IESI in substantial risk of SEC and/or  
16 State investigations.

17 113. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan made numerous unauthorized changes to the  
18 registration of IESI's stock through IESI's online transfer agent, Transfer Online, Inc., including,  
19 but not limited to, converting three hundred thousand (300,000) shares of preferred stock Dr. Yang  
20 pledged as collateral for a loan to three hundred thousand (300,000) shares of common stock of  
21 IESI, then selling the stock to third parties, all of which occurred when the loan was not due.

22 114. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan have wasted corporate assets by overpaying  
23 themselves, their affiliates, and third parties for services and by paying for professional services  
24 from people who are not licensed to provide such professional services.

25 115. On behalf of IESI, Foster, Cochrane and Dornan hired Cochrane's wife Young Sook  
26 Jo to perform legal work. Young Sook Jo regularly invoiced IESI for her fees. IESI held Young  
27 Sook Jo out to third parties as the legal counsel for IESI. Young Sook Jo is not licensed to practice  
28



1 law in Nevada or any United States jurisdiction. Cochrane knew that Young Sook Jo was not a  
2 licensed attorney and abused his position as an Officer and Director of IESI by hiring his wife to  
3 handle legal matters for IESI.

4 116. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan used IESI to pay themselves through affiliates they  
5 owned or controlled.

6 117. Foster used IESI funds on the following items for his personal benefit when he:

- 7 a. Wired a Fifteen Thousand Nine Hundred dollar (\$15,900.00) retainer to Harry Long  
8 for the SBI Bankruptcy;
- 9 b. Paid Joseph Pittera Three Thousand dollars (\$3,000.00) for Valcom's legal fees;
- 10 c. Charged IESI Twelve Thousand dollars (\$12,000.00) for travel and legal fees;
- 11 d. Paid Five Thousand dollars (\$5,000.00) in legal fees for the Piedmont Property;
- 12 e. Paid Valcom's One Thousand Five Hundred Twenty dollar (\$1,520.00) PR  
13 Newswire bill;
- 14 f. Purchased Delta Airline tickets for his common-law wife, Karen Anderson, in the  
15 amount of One Thousand One Hundred Nine dollars and Eighty cents (\$1,109.80)  
16 and, on another occasion, One Thousand Two Hundred Five dollars and Twenty-  
17 nine cents (\$1,205.29);
- 18 g. Paid One Thousand Three Hundred Eighty-seven dollars (\$1,387.00) for  
19 transmission repairs to his car;
- 20 h. Paid One Thousand Eight Hundred Nine dollars and Eighteen cents (\$1,809.18) for  
21 car repairs and gas;
- 22 i. Paid Seven Hundred Ninety-three dollars and Sixty-four cents (\$793.64) for tires for  
23 his car;
- 24 j. Purchased a Digital Video Camera for himself in the amount of One Thousand Four  
25 Hundred Ninety-nine dollars and Ninety-nine cents (\$1,499.99);
- 26 k. Paid Five Hundred Ninety dollars (\$590.00) in fees for Valcom's required filings  
27 with the SEC;
- 28

- 1 l. Paid Joanne Maddox Five Hundred dollars (\$500.00) (c/o Harry Long) for title work  
2 on the Piedmont Property;
- 3 m. IESI paid for vehicle rental and gas purchases in Burbank, California and Panama  
4 City, Florida (where Foster and Anderson have a home);
- 5 n. Paid One Hundred dollars (\$100.00) for Costco membership;
- 6 o. Paid Ninety dollars (\$90.00) for Sam's Club membership;
- 7 p. Paid for SBI Communication's filing fees with the Nevada Secretary of State;
- 8 q. Paid in part for Foster's vacation in Valencia, California;
- 9 r. Paid a Wire transfer to Leah Kerce;
- 10 s. Paid for his own dry cleaning; and
- 11 t. Paid for Valcom and Eye Span's Federal Express bills.
- 12 118. As a Director of IESI, Dornan owed the shareholders the fiduciary duty to manage  
13 IESI affairs and preserve its assets.
- 14 119. Dornan violated this duty when he sold IESI securities based on material  
15 misrepresentations contained in the SB-2 and the Memoranda.
- 16 120. Dornan also breached his fiduciary duties by wasting corporate assets.
- 17 121. In February 2004, Dornan and Cochrane agreed that Dornan would own at least as  
18 many shares of IESI as "those held by any other founding shareholder, including Patrick Cochrane."
- 19 122. Cochrane invoiced IESI for his wife's and daughter's flights to Las Vegas, Nevada  
20 and tickets to a Celine Dion show. Cochrane also invoiced IESI for his personal expenses as well.
- 21 123. Cochrane received Ten Thousand dollars (\$10,000.00) for a Russian trip but  
22 submitted receipts totaling Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Four dollars and Twenty cents  
23 (\$7,704.20). Some of the receipts he submitted had charges for a hospital visit and laundry.
- 24 124. At all times since the formation of IESI, Foster, Cochrane and Dornan have  
25 completely controlled and dominated the Board of Directors of IESI.
- 26 125. Yang is the owner of several technologies (the "Technologies").
- 27 126. Yang and Chai are the principals of Hy-En Research, Ltd. ("Hy-En"), a Korean  
28 corporation.

1 127. In 2004, Hy-En was working on the Technologies. In 2004 IESI wanted to acquire  
2 the rights to the Technologies from Yang and Chai.

3 128. IESI agreed to pay Yang and Chai Fifteen Million dollars (\$15,000,000.00).

4 129. Instead of actually paying Plaintiffs Fifteen Million dollars (\$15,000,000.00), Foster,  
5 Cochran and Dornan paid Yang and Chai with six million (6,000,000) preferred shares of IESI  
6 stock valued at Two dollars and Fifty cents (\$2.50) per share.

7 130. The preferred stock was issued to Yang and Chai as follows: four million two  
8 hundred thousand (4,200,000) to Yang, and one million eight hundred thousand (1,800,000) to  
9 Chai.

10 131. Although Yang and Chai were given six million (6,000,000) shares in IESI for the  
11 Technologies, Foster, Cochran and Dornan claim to have unilaterally reduced Yang and Chai's  
12 shares in IESI to three million (3,000,000).

13 132. On January 15, 2005, Hy-En Research Co. Ltd. ("Maker") made a promissory note  
14 ("Note") for Three Hundred Thousand dollars (\$300,000.00). The Note was payable to IESI.

15 133. The Note states in relevant part:

16 The undersigned . . . promises to pay . . . \$300,000 . . . said principal sum shall  
17 bear interest on the unpaid balance at the rate of five percent (5%) per annum from  
18 the date of this Note until paid in full. Principal and interest shall be payable in one  
19 installment in full. The installment of principal and interest shall be due and payable  
20 on the fifteenth (15th) day of January 2006, or upon demand of the Holder [IESI].

21 134. The Note was executed on January 15, 2005.

22 135. On January 13, 2006, Yang and Maker wrote to the Officers and Directors of IESI to  
23 tender Three Hundred Fifteen Thousand dollars (\$315,000.00) to repay the Note.

24 136. The Note also states:

25 Assets (300,000 of Preferred Stock of IESI) of Dr. Hyunik Yang, an individual  
26 "Guarantor" secure this note. In the event of default under the terms, the Holder  
27 hereof shall have the right and option to declare the entire indebtedness secured  
28 hereby to be at once due and payable. [sic] . . .

The security of this note will be 300,000 shares of IESI Preferred Stock owned by  
Dr. Hyunik Yang.

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1 137. Yang guaranteed the Note and offered three hundred thousand (300,000) shares of  
2 his preferred stock in IESI as collateral for the Note.

3 138. Notwithstanding that Yang's shares of stock were collateral for the Note, Foster,  
4 Cochrane and Dornan immediately converted Yang's preferred stock to common stock, then sold it  
5 to third parties, including, but not limited to, Tommy McGrath ("McGrath").

6 139. On January 13, 2006 Yang and Maker tendered the funds necessary to release any  
7 claim that IESI had to the three hundred thousand (300,000) shares of preferred stock.

8 140. Yang requested that IESI exchange Three Hundred Fifteen Thousand dollars  
9 (\$315,000.00) for the Certificate of Stock IESI held as collateral for the loan.

10 141. On January 18, 2006, notwithstanding the fact that Foster, Cochrane and Dornan had  
11 already converted and sold Yang's three hundred thousand (300,000) shares of preferred stock, IESI  
12 agreed to accept Yang's tender of funds and return his stock certificate.

13 142. At the time Foster, Cochrane and Dornan agreed to accept Yang's tender of funds  
14 and to return his stock certificate, they knew that their statement was untrue and intended that Yang  
15 rely on the statement.

16 143. Shortly after the tender offer, Yang was contacted by McGrath who stated that the  
17 Three Hundred Fifteen Thousand dollars (\$315,000.00) should be paid to him.

18 144. When questioned about McGrath, Foster, Cochrane and Dornan admitted that the  
19 funds were payable to McGrath, not IESI.

20 145. On February 1, 2006, Yang tendered Three Hundred Fifteen Thousand dollars  
21 (\$315,000.00) for two (2) Lost Note Affidavits, one (1) from IESI and one (1) from McGrath, and a  
22 certificate for three hundred thousand (300,000) shares of preferred stock in IESI.

23 146. At that time, Foster, Cochrane and Dornan represented that the certificate  
24 represented Yang's original three hundred thousand (300,000) shares of preferred stock.

25 147. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan merely issued three hundred thousand (300,000)  
26 preferred shares of stock to Yang to cover up the previous conversion and sale of his stock to  
27 McGrath.

28 ////

1 148. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan were not authorized to issue three hundred thousand  
2 (300,000) shares of preferred stock, and the issuance of the shares violated the Articles, Bylaws and  
3 applicable laws governing IESI.

4 149. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan received a commission for the sale of Yang's stock.

5 150. Yang and Chai have been damaged by Foster, Cochrane and Dornan's unilateral  
6 cancellation of three million (3,000,000) shares of stock.

7 151. Foster caused a substantial part of the assets of IESI to be invested in SBI.

8 152. In 2004, Foster was the sole shareholder of SBI.

9 153. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan, with the intent and for the purpose of making and  
10 securing certain supposed advantages to themselves, caused a special meeting of the stockholders of  
11 IESI to be called and held at the office of IESI to consider and act on the proposal to buy all the  
12 issued and outstanding shares of stock in SBI ("SBI Sale").

13 154. During the special meeting of the shareholders, a resolution was presented and  
14 approved, directing IESI to complete the SBI Sale.

15 155. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan, with the intent and for the purpose of making and  
16 securing certain supposed advantages to themselves, caused a special meeting of the Board of  
17 Directors of Defendant corporation IESI to be called and held at the office of IESI to consider and  
18 act on the SBI Sale.

19 156. During the special meeting of the Board a resolution was presented and approved,  
20 directing IESI to complete the SBI Sale.

21 157. Immediately on approval of the SBI Sale, Foster, as Secretary and Treasurer of IESI,  
22 executed and delivered to SBI a purchase agreement to purchase all the issued and outstanding  
23 shares of stock in SBI and all of the property, real and personal, franchises and rights of property of  
24 which SBI was the owner.

25 158. Foster, Cochrane and Dornan valued the Piedmont Property from between One  
26 Million Two Hundred Thousand dollars (\$1,200,000.00) to Eight Million One Hundred Thousand  
27 dollars (\$8,100,000.00), depending on the circumstances of the valuation.

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